Contacto: negocios@utdt.edu

Abstract
Todos los semestres la Universidad lleva a cabo el proceso de planificación académica, que consiste en determinar el horario y el aula para cada clase de cada sección de cada curso, y programar la preinscripción automática de los estudiantes ingresantes. Se trata de un procedimiento que involucra a muchas personas y que es cada vez más difícil de realizar de forma manual, en un contexto en el que la Universidad está creciendo sostenidamente. En esta charla, presentaremos un proyecto que involucra la implementación de herramientas informáticas para asistir al Departamento de Registro de Alumnos al momento de realizar esta tarea. Describiremos el desarrollo de modelos de programación matemática para el diseño de los horarios, la asignación de aulas y la preinscripción de los estudiantes ingresantes, el resultado de la prueba piloto realizada para el semestre en curso, y las acciones que actualmente se están llevando a cabo para implementar esta herramienta.

Javier Marenco es profesor e investigador en Ciencias de la Computación, especializado en temas de optimización combinatoria. Se desempeña como profesor investigador asociado en UTDT. Sus áreas de interés incluyen temas de programación lineal entera, combinatoria poliedral y aplicaciones de investigación operativa. Completó su doctorado en Ciencias de la Computación y su licenciatura en Ciencias de la Computación en la Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales de la UBA.

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Viernes 19 de abril

Martín Rossi | UdeSA

"Incorporating Cultural Context into Safe-Water Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Egypt"

Abstract
Adoption rates of safe drinking water are low in developing countries. In regions where centralized water treatment infrastructure is absent, the conventional policy response is to enhance access to safe water via point-of-use chlorination. Previous research, however, reports a ceiling in adoption rates of chlorinated water at 50 percent, even when chlorine is provided for free. We report experimental evidence that a cultural-friendly technology, which provides filtered water that resembles local traditional water, leads to higher adoption rates and willingness to pay than usual chlorinated water provision. We document adoption rates of 91 percent for filtered water, 42 percentage points higher than for chlorinated water. Willingness to pay is 61 percent higher for filtered water compared to chlorinated water. Ancillary experiments indicate that taste significantly influences the way individuals perceive the healthiness of water. According to our findings, policymakers should redirect their efforts away from the current mainstream approach of subsidized chlorine and instead explore alternative strategies that consider local communities’ culture and preferences.

Martín Antonio Rossi is Professor of Economics at Universidad de San Andres. He received his PhD in Economics from University of Oxford. His research focuses on the intersection between development economics, political economy, and public economics, and it has been published in leading academic journals such as Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, American Economic Review: Insights, Economic Journal, Review of Economics and Statistics, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Journal of Public Economics, and Journal of Development Economics. He is research affiliate for J-PAL, and his professional activities include works for UNICEF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank.

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Viernes 3 de mayo

Guillermo Solovey | Universidad de Buenos Aires

"Incorporating Cultural Context into Safe-Water Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Egypt"

Abstract
La preocupación por la desinformación se basa, en gran medida, por el impacto negativo que tiene sobre las decisiones de las personas. En este seminario voy a contar un trabajo reciente en el que evaluamos el rol de dos factores que facilitan la creencia en desinformación. Uno de ellos es la propensión a pensar rápido, sin reflexionar lo suficiente sobre el contenido. El otro factor es el partidismo, la tendencia a creer que la información que se alinea con nuestra forma de ver el mundo es correcta. Apoyándonos en un modelo de toma de decisiones y estadística bayesiana, diseñamos un experimento para probar cuatro hipótesis sobre los factores asociados con la probabilidad de creer afirmaciones de políticos de Argentina. Nuestro trabajo, además de contribuir a entender un poco mejor este fenómeno, amplía la evidencia existente del área dado que la mayoría de los estudios se focalizan en el caso de Estados Unidos y Europa.

Guillermo Solovey es doctor en Física por la Universidad de Buenos Aires, realizó estancias posdoctorales en la Universidad de Columbia y en The Rockefeller University, en las cuales se especializó en neurociencia computacional, ciencias cognitivas y del comportamiento. Actualmente es profesor de la Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales de la UBA e investigador del CONICET en el Instituto de Cálculo, del cual también es vicedirector. Dicta materias de grado y posgrado en el área de Estadística y Ciencia de Datos, y con su grupo de trabajo realiza experimentos y modelos computacionales para entender el proceso de toma de decisiones humanas, el rol de la incertidumbre y la metacognición.

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Viernes 17 de mayo

Julio Elías | Universidad del CEMA

"Compulsory Voting, Collateral Sanctions, and Political Inequality: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment"

Abstract
Countries that compel voting often combine harsh sanctions for abstention with trivial fines to avoid punishments. Voter turnout theories based on rational self-interest suggest that these fines may undermine the collateral sanctions. We test this hypothesis using a field experiment in Buenos Aires. We randomized whether we informed eligible voters that abstention is punished by the inability to apply for government-provided services and be hired as a public employee for three years and delivered additional information that paying a 0.25 USD fine exempted the subject from these penalties. Information about sanctions increases the probability of voting by 3.4 pp relative to a control group that received no message. The effects are strongest for those who are unlikely to vote. Additional information about the symbolic fine decreases the likeli- hood of voting relative to providing the sanctions without the additional information, but the decrease is small and not statistically significant. These results suggest that collateral sanctions for abstention are an effective way to increase voter turnout and reduce voting inequality, even when the cost of avoiding the sanctions is minimal. We also compare young and old citizens who have the option to vote to show that the legal obligation to vote substantially increases turnout. Combining the results from the field experiment and the comparison analysis of young and old citizens suggests that compulsory voting laws serve an expressive function. 


Julio Elías es profesor en el Departamento de Economía y en la Escuela de Negocios de la Universidad del CEMA (UCEMA). También es Director Ejecutivo del Centro de Economía de la Creatividad UCEMA, e investigador asociado del Center of Excellence on Human Capital and Economic Growth and Development de la Universidad de Búfalo. Sus trabajos de investigación recientes se han concentrado en la economía de los trasplantes de órganos. Fue Visiting Fellow del Becker Friedman Institute de la Universidad de Chicago, y profesor visitante en el Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de Western Ontario, Canadá. También fue profesor en el Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de Búfalo durante el período 2005-2008 y profesor visitante de la misma institución en 2014. Obtuvo el Doctorado en Economía en la Universidad de Chicago y la Licenciatura en Economía en la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.

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Viernes 31 de mayo

Santiago Gallino | University of Pennsylvania

"Order-Based Trade Credits and Operational Performance in the Nanostore Retail Channel"

Abstract
Millions of nanostores serve bottom-of-the-pyramid consumers in emerging markets. Their suppliers, consumer packaged goods (CPG) companies, struggle with high operational costs that largely stem from shopkeepers’ liquidity constraints. We empirically investigate whether suppliers can improve operational performance by allowing nanostore shopkeepers to delay order payment by a short period of time. We term this delayed payment alternative “order-based trade credit” (OBTC) and examine the key trade-off  that suppliers face when transacting with it. While OBTC can create efficiency gains when selling and delivering products to nanostores, it is risky, as shopkeepers might default on their credit lines. We leverage data from a nanostore supplier offering OBTC to many of the nanostores it serves over an extended period of time. These data allow us to assess the effect of this novel policy on the operational performance of the supplier through a difference-in-differences approach with nearest-neighbor matching and a control function approach relying on exogenous variation isolated from two instruments. We find that OBTC leads to substantial gains for nanostore suppliers across a range of important operational drivers. Therefore, the benefits of OBTC compensate the risk that suppliers take in financing shopkeepers’ inventory under a wide range of scenarios. When examining the mechanism underlying this effect, we find that OBTC mitigates  shopkeepers’  cash shortage and leads to greater engagement with the supplier’s sales representatives. Investigating the heterogeneity in the effect, we find that nanostores receiving less product relative to others in the sample benefit the most from OBTC. Overall, we provide evidence that OBTC, an interest-free financing scheme for retail microbusinesses in emerging markets, may be economically sustainable despite the associated risks. OBTC has the potential to help narrowing down the financing gap that other schemes, such as microcredits, struggle to close as a result of their reliance on expensive interest rates and taxing requirements on  microentrepreneurs.

Santiago Gallino studies both digital transformation and store execution issues in retail. He has researched with and consulted for numerous organizations. His research has won multiple awards and has appeared in journals such as Management Science, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Operations Research, Journal of Marketing, Sloan Management Review, and Harvard Business Review. His research has been covered frequently by several media outlets.
Before joining Wharton, Professor Gallino worked at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. He holds a PhD in Operations and Information Management and a Master’s in Statistics from the University of Pennsylvania where he was a Fulbright Scholar, an MBA from IAE Business School, and a degree in Electrical Engineering from Universidad de Buenos Aires.

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Viernes 31 de mayo

Tatiana Rosá | Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

"Schooling and Intergenerational Mobility: Consequences of Expanding Higher Education Institutions"

Abstract
Poor post-secondary education infrastructure and opportunities partly explain the low higher education rates in developing countries. This paper estimates the effect of a program that improved post-secondary education infrastructure by building many university campuses across Uruguay. Leveraging temporal and geographic variation in program implementation, we use a two-way fixed effect design and comprehensive administrative records to assess the program’s causal impact. By lowering the distance to a university campus, the program successfully increased university enrollment, particularly of less privileged students who are the first in their families to attend a university. The program impacted students from localities up to 30 kilometers from the new campus, reducing spatial inequality. Importantly, this expansion did not lower university completion rates. Furthermore, the program increased high school attendance and completion rates and the proportion of educated workers in the affected localities.

Tatiana Rosá is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. She specializes in the fields of Industrial Organization and Innovation. She holds a PhD in Economics and a Master in Economics & Finance from CEMFI.

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