Novedades
06/11/2024
Nuevo artículo de los profesores Alejandro Bonvecchi y Paula Clerici
Los profesores del Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales, Alejandro Bonvecchi y Paula Clerici, publicaron el siguiente artículo en Studies in Comparative International Development: "Representation and Delegation in Trade Policymaking: The Political Economy of Trade Taxes in Argentina".
Abstract: The literature typically argues that legislative influence on trade policy is scant and reactive because trade policymaking power is largely delegated to the executive. Bridging the literatures on political economy and legislative politics, we analyze legislative activity on trade taxes in a setting in which delegated powers reverted to the legislature after decades under executive jurisdiction: the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Our findings reveal that delegation is the prevailing strategy, legisla-tors intervene prompted by economic shocks, and the contents of their initiatives are contingent to the effects of shocks on local economies. When appreciation rages or devaluation is insufficient, legislators representing export-oriented economies submit liberalizing bills, and those representing inward-oriented economies submit protectionist initiatives. Otherwise, delegation remains the norm and legislators stra-tegically employ declarative bills to signal their preferred policies.
Para visualizar este documento, por favor hacer clic aquí.
Abstract: The literature typically argues that legislative influence on trade policy is scant and reactive because trade policymaking power is largely delegated to the executive. Bridging the literatures on political economy and legislative politics, we analyze legislative activity on trade taxes in a setting in which delegated powers reverted to the legislature after decades under executive jurisdiction: the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Our findings reveal that delegation is the prevailing strategy, legisla-tors intervene prompted by economic shocks, and the contents of their initiatives are contingent to the effects of shocks on local economies. When appreciation rages or devaluation is insufficient, legislators representing export-oriented economies submit liberalizing bills, and those representing inward-oriented economies submit protectionist initiatives. Otherwise, delegation remains the norm and legislators stra-tegically employ declarative bills to signal their preferred policies.
Para visualizar este documento, por favor hacer clic aquí.