In this seminar I want to do two quite different things. Part I attempts to map normative arguments against the sale of organs on to regulatory proposals for “organ markets.”. Those who oppose organ sale may oppose it for a number of different normative reasons independently or in conjunction, and the goal is to show to whether someone who opposes the sale of organs for X normative reasons can nonetheless support some forms of a regulated organ market. The goal might also be put in more positive terms, to show those who are unsure about whether organ markets are a good idea what forms of regulation would make organ markets worthwhile to pursue. Parts II attempts to add to the literature on regulated organ markets byengaging a particular type of argument related to just distributions that has been offered as a reason to be concerned about organ markets. This part presses on the assumption that the distribution of organs in systems where compensation is prohibited is itself a just baseline against which to measure the distribution that results when compensation is permitted. 



Antes de dedicarse a la docencia, el profesor Cohen se desempeñó como letrado en la corte de Apelaciones, en el Departamento de Justicia y en la Corte Suprema de Justicia de los Estados Unidos, donde recientemente actuó como litigante en el resonante caso Myriad. (ver más información sobre el profesor Cohen)

* El seminario se dictará en idioma inglés, sin traducción.
* Actividad gratuita, requiere inscripción.
* Aula A104